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. IN THE 
Supreme Court of .Appeals of Virginia 
AT RICHMOND. 
__ ,! .• :: - - ~ 
Record No. 2693 
HOME BREWING COMP ANY, INCORPORATED, 
Plaintiff in Error, 
versw;; 
CITY OF RICHMOND, .l!. CORPORATION, 11. 
· Defendant in Error. 
':,. ·' ' 




To the Honorable Justices of the S,u .. prenie Court of Atppeals 
of Virginia: _ r .. : • !_ • • ;' 
-".- ·r. !•. • 
Your petitioner, Home Brewing Company,· ·Incorporated, 
respectfully represents that it is aggrieved by the judgment, 
or order, of the Law and Equity Court of the -City of Rich-
mond, entered on the 18th day of August, 1942, in a proceed~ 
ing by Notice of Motion for J udgrnent in said Court in which . 
it was the defendant in a suit for the payment of certain 
licenses, or license taxes and interest thereon assessed against 
it, as a manufacturer of soft drinks, by the Commissioner of 
the Revenue of the City of Richmond on behalf of the City 
of Richmond. 
This case is presented to this Honorable Court on the rec-
ord of the proceedings in the trial court. The transcript 
2* of the *record and of the testimony with exhibits, and 
other incidents in the trial of the above case is attached 
hereto, · 
-·.,: 
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Counsel for. the petitioner desires lo use this petition as 
the opening brief. 
NATURE OF THE CASE. 
This was a proceeding wh~:.;~i.µ the plaintiff in error was 
the defendant in a suit brought against it, by Notice of Mo-
tion for Judgment, by the City of Richmond, praying for 
judgment for the amount of license taxes, interest and pen-
alty, alleged to be due the City of Richmond for the years 
1936, 1937, 1938, 1939, and 1940, at the rate of $200.00 for 
each year. The assessments were made against the peti-
tioner under the color of authority of certain ordinances which 
are ·questioned as to their legality and, for which reason, pe-
titiqner contends said assessments were erroneous, and that 
the court below erred in its judgment. 
Home Brewing -Oompa.ny, Incorporated, a corporation duly 
chartered under the laws of the State of Virginia, was, dur-
ing the years 1936, 1937, 1938, 19'39, and 1940, and for a 
number of years prior thereto, eng~aged in the business of 
manufacturing soft drinks in the .City of Richmond and sell-
ing these manufactured products to licensed dealers and re-
tailers in the City of Riehmond and in other localities within 
the State of Virginia. The petitioner did not and does not 
sell its products to consumers. (Page 29, Stenographer's 
Transcript. Testimony, Witness Bernier.) P. 42, Record. 
The record shows that your petitioner was assessed 
3• for the •1936 tax on the 16th day of Dec~mber, 1939. On 
the same date an assessment for 1937 tax was made. 
Taxes for the years 1938, 1939 and 1940 were assessed on-Jai1~ 
uary 25, 1938, May 9, 1939, and March 18, 1940. (Page 6, 
Stenog-rapher's Transcript, Witness Austin.) P. 17, Record. 
The aforesaid assessments were made p~rsuant to the pro-
visions of Section 62, Chapter 10, R.ichmond City Oode, as 
amended to December 24, 1930, and Section 70, Chapter 10, 
Richmond City Code, as ame~ded by ordinance approved 
December 17, 1937. Those ordinances which have been filed 
as exhibits and made a part of the record, are as follows : 
· '' 62. Bottling Establishmenta~-fers9ns, fir:i;ns and cor-
p()rations, engl\g-ed in the qusine~s of bottling ~oft' drinks, 
mineral or aerated water, either or all .. : .$200.00 .... not 
pro.r~ted. '' · 
'' 70. Manufacturing· and Bottling Establishments.-Per-
sons, :firms and corpo.rations engaged in the business of manu-
facturing and bottling soft drinks, mineral or aerated waters1 
either or all .... $200:00. Not prorated.'' 
Home Brewing Co., Inc.; v. City of Richmond. 3 
It should be noted that the ordinance as amended on De-
cember 17, 1937, simply shows the addition of the word manu-
facturing. 
There was introduced in evidence at the trial of this case · 
certified copies of a petition for a refund of license taxes 
which had been assessed against and collected from the ~ich-
mond Orange -Crush Bottling.Corporation, and a copy of the 
order issued by the presiding judge of the trial court in a 
proceeding which questioned the validity of the ordinance 
which imposed the aforesaid tax. In that case the City of 
Richmond was order'ed to refund the taxes paid by the 
4* petitioner on the grounds that ~the assessment was er-
roneous and the collection of the taxes illegal, and that 
the ordinance was invali~d. This order was entered by another 
judge but in the same court wherein the case in question was 
tried. (Pp. 56-59, Record.) 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED. 
The questions here presented concern the validity of the 
ordinances involved and the ·assessments made under the 
authority of them. 
The validity of the ordinance of December 17, 1937, is ques-
tioned upon two points : 
1. Did the adoption of the ordinance by the Council of the 
City of Richmond on December 17, 19-37, repeal by implica-
tion the ordinance which was in effect prior to that date, or 
did the Council accept the order in. the Orange Crush Bot-
tling Corporation case as being a judicial decision that the 
prior ordinance was invalid 1 If the ordinance was invalid 
then the City of Richmond had no authority to assess the 
taxes against your petitioner for the years 193'6 and 1937. 
2. If the ordinance in effect prior to December 17, 1937, 
as well as the ordinance approved on that date are claimed, 
and they are, as the authority for the assessment of a license 
tax against a manufacturer, the validity of both are chal-
lenged on the grounds that Section 188 of the State Tax Code, 
as amended to 1938 and effeetive subsequent thereto, ex-
pressly prohibits the City of Richmond from imposing a li-
cense tax of any kind on a manufacturer such as the pe-
5,r; titioner._; that the City *of Richmond imposes a machinery 
tax on.manufacturers and that this tax is in fact a license 
tax which ca.rries with it the privileg·e to manufacture_ prod-
ucts: and that the tax prescribed bv either Section 62 or 
Section 70 of C~apter 10 of the Richmond City Code is in 
4 Supreme Cou~·t of Appeals of Virginia. 
violation of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the Federal Constitution. 
ASSIGNMENT OF1 ERROR. 
In assigning error the attention of this Honorable Court 
is respectfully directed to the situation where two learned 
judges presiding in the same court reach opposite conclusions 
on the same laws and faets, such as exists in connection with 
the question as to the validity of the ordinances questioned 
in the case now before this Court. This situation has left 
taxpayers bewildered, and for this reason it is proper and 
advisable for the court of last i-esort to settle the questions 
.involved in orq.er that those taxpayers who are affected 
may have a definite determination as to the validity of the 
law under which they may or may not conduct their busi-
ness. 
This assignment of error concerns the validity of Section 
62 and .Section 70 of Chapter 10 of the R.ichmond City ;Code. 
The record shows that the petitioner is a manufacturer of 
soft drinks; that it pays a tax on capital to the State, and. 
that it sells its products only to licensed dealers and re-
tailers. 
6* *Manufacturers are taxed by the State, under Section 
73 of the State Tax Code, upon capital employed in the 
business. Capital is defined, and excepted from the definition 
is machinery and tools, and real estate, which subjects are re-
quired to be separately assessed and segTegated for local 
taxation. There is nothing in this section either auth_orizing 
or forbidqing furt}J.er license taxes. 
By the terms of Section "188, paragraph 15, of the State 
Tax Code, manufacturers are exempted from license taxes of 
all kinds. This section of the Tax Code is as follows: 
"A manufacturer taxable on capital by the State may, 
except as in this section provided, sell and deliver at the same 
time to licensed dealers or retailers, but not to consumers, 
anywhere in the State without the payment of any license 
tax of any kind for such privilege to the .State, or to any city, 
town, or county." 
- It is earnestly contended that Section 188 of the State Tax 
Code defi~itely prohibits the imposition of any kind of a li-
cense tax upon the petitioner which comes squarely within 
the meaning of this section of the Code. 
It is further submitted that when the rule as to the inten-
- t.ion of the legislature when. it enacted the law is considered,. 
Home Brewing Co., Inc., v. City of- Richmond. 5 
it becomes apparent that by incorporating the foregoing ex-
emption in the act, its purpose was to encourage manufac-
turing and to increase the flow. of commerce in the State of 
Virginia, and that it reali~ed that if there. were not re-
straints placed upon cities, towns, counties, and the State, 
there would possibly be a multitude of taxes imposed 
7* on manufacturers and the· efforts of the *legislature to 
attract industry into the .State would be defeated. 
This position is further strengthened by the language used 
in the charter of the City of .Richmond under which the leg-
islature has granted certain powers to the City of Rich-
mond. Section 61 of· the charter of the City of Richmond 
provides: 
"61. For the execution of its powers and duties the City 
Council may raise annually, by taxes and assessments in said 
city, such si.1ms ·of money a~ they shall deem necesaary to de-
fray expenses of the same, and in such manner as they shall 
deem expedient, in accordance with the laws of this State and 
of the United S'tates, and may, by curative ordinance, ratify 
and confirm irregular assessments and levies of taxes here-
tofore or hereafter made, and the acts of all ministerial offi-
cers in connection therewith, and any such ordinance here-
tofore passed is hereby ratified and confirmed.'' · 
By this Act, the legislature has definitely placed a limita-
tion upon the power of the ·city of Richmond to impose li-
cense taxes or make assessments, and it is respectfully sub-
mitted that Sections 62 and 70 of Chapter 10 of the Rich-
mond City Code, above ref erred to, are not in accordance 
. with Section 188 of the State Tax Code and are, therefore, 
invalid. 
In 37 C. J. 185, Section 34, it is said: 
'' An act or ordinance imposing license taxes must be within 
the limits of the power under which it is enacted." 
It is submitted that the City Council exceeded its powers 
when the ordinances in controversy were adopted. 
. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ORDlNANCES. 
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to the Constitution of the United States provides: 
8*' "'"' '* * No state shall make or enforce any law * * * ; 
*nor deny any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws.'' 
6 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
It is well settled under the Fourteenth Amendment that 
license taxes. m-q.st bear equally and uniformly on all persons 
iri the same :elass, and if a license tax makes an arbitrary dis-
tinctiQ~ petween persons similarly situated and does not fall 
alike on· all persons engaged in the same class· of businesR, 
it is unconstitutional and void. 37 C. J. 200, Section 53; 
In the case before .the Court, the subject being considered 
is a license tax upon a class of business-manufacturers, and 
not upon classes of persons in the manufacturing business. 
Therefore, and in addition to the exemption set forth in Sec-
tion 188 of the State Ta'{ Code, a license tax imposed against 
one manufacturer while~ other . manufacturers· are not as-
sessed makes the tax imposed 11pon the petitioner discrimina-
tory and in contravention to the constitutional limitations 
set forth above. 
~ Bradley d; Co. v. City of Richmond, 110 Va. 521, 227 
U .. S. 4 77, the Court said: 
'' It is competent for a city to classify different occupa-
tions· for the purpose of imposing license taxes, and in order 
to render a classification illegal, the party assailing it must 
show that the business discriminated against is precisely the 
same as that included in the class which is alleged to be fa-
vored.'' · 
It may be argued, lJ.nd it is conceded, that the City of Rich-
mond has imposed license taxes upon persons engaged in 
various manufacturing enterprises. This, ~owever, does not 
bring the ordinances of the City of Richmond which impose 
license taxes on difforcnt groups of manufacturers within 
9"' the requirements of the Fourteenth * Amendment, be-. 
cause there are numerous groups of manufacturers 
against whom the City of Richmond has never made an as-
sessment of a license fox for the reason that it had no au-
thority to do so, either under <;>rdi'nance or under the consti-
tution, as well as by reason of the limitations imposed by 
its charter. 
It is, therefore, submitted that because of the failure of 
the City Council of the City of Richmond to provide for the 
assessment of license taxes against aJl manufacturers, in-
.stead of against a few groups of manufacturers, including 
the group of which the petitioner is a member, further re11-
ders the license taxes il)lposed on the petitioner invalid. The 
Court is urged not to lose sight of the fact that this nues- · 
tion concerns discrimination within a class-not methods or 
rates by which persons are taxed. 
Rome Brewing Co., Inc., v. City of Richmond. 7. 
This Court said in Con.sumers Brewing Conipany v. Nor-
folk, 101 Va. 171: · 
'' A manufacturer is one who is engaged in the business of 
working raw materials into wares suitable for use.'' 
The language _used in that definition establishes one, and 
only one, classification of the business of working· raw ma-
terials into wares suitable for use. Every person, firm, or 
corporation engag·ed in such business is a manufacturer re-
gardless of what raw materials are worked into wares suit-
able for use. A legislative body cannot by simply using 
words or phrases in its acts or ordinances chang·e the .basic 
character of an enterprise, particularly after the character 
of the business has been judicially determined. 
DOUBLE TAXATION. 
10* *That Section 70 of Chapter 1.0, and likewise Section 
62, are invalid is. shown by the fact that the City of Rich-
mond imposes a tax on manufacturers for using machinery 
and tools in a man'Q.f acturing business, and by the terms of 
sub-section ( c) of Chapter lOj Section 1,, a different tax is 
imposed on machinery a.nd tools not 1.ised in a manufacturing 
business, thus classifying one as a manufacturer's machinery 
tax and the other as a tangible personal property· tax. In the 
latter case the rate is higher. 
By reason of the different classifications the City Council 
has given machinery, the fact is that the tax on the use of 
manufacturers' machinery is actually a tax. or license for 
the privilege of working raw materials into wares suitable 
for use a.nd not a property tax, ancl by that token, and re-
gardless of the prohibitions of Section 188 of the State Tax 
·Code, the . City of Ricl1mond is already collecting from the 
petitioner a license tax for the privilege of bottling and manu-
facturing. 
In Commonwealth v. Hntzler, 1.24 Va. 1_38, th~ Court said: 
"The license tax imposed on private bankers by section 
78 of the tax hill, specifically and exclusively measured 'on 
the capital', must be regarded not merely as a privilege tax 
but as a· charge upon capital itself, and being an additional 
assessment under section 8 of schedule C, being upon 'capital 
otherwise taxed', is plainly nnla wful. ~' · 
The Court. in the same case ~J~,o .. s~id : 
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''It is not denied that the legislature has the power to im-
pose a license tax upon a trade or business and a property 
tax or ad valorem tax upon the capital employed therein.'' · 
Petitioner concedes that both a license tax and a property 
tax may be lawfully assessed against au individual or 
11 * against *a businesH, in the absence of prohibitions. Pe-
titioner does not concede that a double license tax is 
lawful. The machinery use tax is not a property tax. This 
tax may be compar.ed with the automobile use tax recently en-
acted by Congress. That tax does not require the owner of 
an automobile to pay for the privilege of owning the machine 
but for the privilege of operating it. In other words it is a 
license to operate the car for the purpose for which it was 
intended. .This is likewise true when a manufacturer pays 
the machinery use tax to the City of Richmond for the priv-
ileg·e of operating the machinery for the purpose of producing 
manufactured products. If, the ref ore, Sections 62 and 70 
of Chapter 10 of the Richmond City Code impose a tax on 
the manufacturing of soft drinks it is obvious that double 
taxation is the result and amounts to an additional assess-
ment which the Court has held in the Hutzler case to be 
plainly unlawful. 
LEGISLATIVE INTENT. 
In pr.esenting this phase of the questions involved in this 
case, petitioner is guided by the rule of decision relating to 
the legislative intent when powers are granted or denied. 
It is conceded that the legislature has the power to delegate 
to the council of a city or town the power to impose taxesr 
But where a tax has bnen imposed without express or im-
plied delegation of such power, or where such power has been 
expressly or impliedly withheld, it is submitted that the as-
sessment of a tax is unlawful. 
12* *In Section 188 of the ·State Tax Code, the legislature 
has plainly said that manufacturers may conduct their 
business witho~t the payment of a. license tax of any kind 
for such privilege to 1:he State, or to any city, town or 
county. 
It may be arg'Ued that Section 188 limits the exemption to 
E=elling and delivering at the same time to licensed dealers 
and retailers, but this is a question of legislative intent. When 
the fact that the legislature has not undertaken to impo~e 
state license taxes on manufacturers but granted them the 
1wi.vileµ;e to manufacture in return for the payment of the 
tax npon capital is considered, it becomes obvious that the 
Holll:e Btewing Co., Inc., v. City of Richmond. 9 
l,egislative intent wa~ to exempt manufacturers from license 
taxes as a means of helping· to promote and encourage the · 
development of industry within .the State of Virginia. 
This legislative intent is further emphasized by the ab-
sence of license taxes against manufacturers by . the State, 
with one exception-Bottlers and manufacturers of soft 
drinks, under Section 199 of the State Tax Code are assessed 
with a tax of $25.00 per year. Upon examination of that 
section it clearly appears that it was not enacted for the 
purpose of raising revenue but as an attempt on the part of 
pressure groups to control competition. This is further evi-
denced by the complete absence of a tax on any other manu-
facturer or class of manufacturers. 
In Commonwealth v. Richmond & P.R. Co., 81 Va. 335, this 
Court held, and cited with approval Petersburg v. 
13* General • Baking Conipany, 170 Va. 303: 
'' This is a question of le'g·islative intent; and in solving the 
question in dispute, we are required to look to the words em-
ployed, according· to their obvious meaning, and in this way 
ascertain and declare what was the leg·islative intent-what 
did the legislature mean by the language employed, and in 
the connection in which it is employed as we find it in the 
act.'' 
As further evidence of the legislature's intention to ex-
empt manufacturers from license taxes, the Court's attention 
is respectfully directed to the provisions of 192a and 192b of 
the State Tax Code which exempt manufacturers from the 
payment of license taxes impos1d by the State or cities and 
towns when they sell and deliver their products to licensed 
dealers and retailers. Likewise Section 192 exempts manu-
facturers from license taxes when they sell their products 
directly to consumers, and this Court in City of Petersburg 
v. General Baking Corn,pa;ny, 179 Va. 303, sustained the ex-
emption. 
Likewise, the legislature has again indicated its intention 
to encourage manufacturing in Virginia by authorizing cities 
and towns to exempt manufacturers from even property taxes 
for a period of five years. · 
To say that the exemptions afforded by the sections of the 
State Tax Code are exemptions from license taxes merely 
for the privileg·e of selling and delivering the products they 
produce, is inconsistent with the plainly obvious intention 
of the legislature to exempt manufacturers from license taxes. 
The purpose of manufacture is sale and distribution, and 
10 Supreme Court _of Appeals of Virginia. 
hence, it is reasonable ,and proper that a manufacturer, 
·14* taxed upon capital '*by the State, and by the City of 
Richmond on the machinery used for manufacturing, 
shou,l.d be exe:t:r1pted from payment of license taxes when he 
comes to djspose of his manufactured products in- the regular 
course of 'business. Capital is employecl to aid manuf actur-
ing~ Machinery is also employed to aid manufacturing. In 
neither case are taxes imposed upon these subjects as prop- · 
erty taxes but rather as occupational or privilege taxes, and 
they are in fact and in law license taxes which authorize 
manufacturers to produce manufactured products. The ex-
emptions set forth in Sections 188, 192a and 192b of -the State 
Tax Code clearly show that it was the intention of the leg-
islature to segregate manufacturers from merchants and 
peddlers and not merely to authorize them to dispose of the 
products they already pay for the privilege of manuf actur-
ing. , 
In Saady v. City of Richtnond, 177 Va. 27, Justice Hudg-
ins, speaking for the Court, . said: 
'' It may be inferred from the pleadings-if not inferred, 
it is conceded that each defendant is engaged in the bottling 
business. •Section 199 of the Tax Code provides, that per-
sons, firms or corporations engaged in such business shall 
be deemed manufacturers and not merchants. ·Section 188 
of the same code provides that a rrianufach;i.rer taxable on 
capital by the State, may sell to wholesalers and retailers 
without payment of ·a license tax of any kind to the State, or 
to any city, town or county for such privilege. This im-
munity from payment of a J.i&ense tax does not apply in the 
event the manufacturer sells to consumers." 
While the Saady case was not decided upon its merits, it 
is 1·espectfully urged that the foregoing statement by Justice 
Hudgins definitely holds that Sections 62 and 70 of 
15* · Chapter 10 *are unlawful and that the judgment of the 
court below was in error in the present case. 
CONCLUSION. 
It is the view of the petitioner that the order entered in 
the Richmond Orange Crush Bottling Corporation case in. the 
La:w and Equity Court of the City of Richmond Qn Decem-
ber 14, 1934, nullified Section 62 of Chapter lO of the Rich-
:p1ond City Code, as amnnded to December. 24, 1930; that py 
reason of this order the tax officials of the City of Richmond 
did not make assessments against the petitioner for the years 
Home ·Brewing Co., Inc., v. City of Richmond. 11 
of 1936 and 1937; that the adoption of Section 70 on Decem-
ber 17, 1937, was because the Uity Council ·ac~nowledged the 
validity of the order as holding the tax to be unlawful; ~hat 
the City Counci~ undertook by the 1937 ordinance to overrule . 
the decision of the court in the .l:tichmond Orange Crush 
Bottling Corporation case; that under the color of authority 
of the 1937 ordinance, the city tax officials have undertaken 
to assess license taxes both before and after the ordinance 
was adopted, and that the said acts of the tax officials were 
illegal and that the ordinances imposing a license tax on the 
petitioner are unlawful. , 
The petitioner, as a manufacturer, is a valuable unit in 
the economic life of the State of Virginia, and it contends that 
it was never the intention of the framers of the Federal 
and State constitutions, or of the leg'islature of Virg·inia, to 
retard progress by authorizing the imposition of innumerable 
taxes on the same subjects and for the same privilege. 
16* •Petitioner, therefore, prays that a writ of error and 
supersedeas to the judgment of the Law and Equity 
Court of the City of Richmond rendered on the 18th day of 
August, 194~, may be awarded, and that said judgment may 
be reviewed; and inasmuch as the whole case was submitted 
at the trial in the lower court and according to petitioner's 
contentions the City of Richmond was without authority to 
assess and/or collect a license tax from it as a inanufacturer 
and bottler of soft drinks, that final judgment be entered 
in favor of the petitioner ( defendant in the lower court) and 
this petitioner will ever pray, etc . 
.An oral presentation is desired. 
This petition will be filed with the clerk, or one of the deputy 
clerks, at the clerk's office of the Supreme Court of Appeals 
of Virginia, at Richmond, Virginia. 
A copy of this petition was delivered to opposing· counsel. 
on the 10th day of November,. 1942. 
C. V. WERNE, . 
Attorney at Law, 
HOME BRE.WING COMP ANY, 
INCORPORATED, 
By C. V. WER.NE, Counsel. 
1439 Central National Bank Building, 
Richmond, Virginia. 
I 
. I : I .: 
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17* *I, C. V. "\Verne, Attorney at Law, whose address is 
1439 Central National Bank Building, Richmond, Vir-
ginia, practicing in the 1Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia, 
do certify th~t in my opinion the decision embodied in the 
judgment complained of in the foregoing petition, which judg-
ment was entered by the Law and h,quity Court of the City of 
Richmond on the 18th day of August, 1942, should be reviewed 
by the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia and said judg-
ment reversed. 
Received November 10, 1942: 
C. V. WERNE, 
Attorney at Law. 
M. B. W .A.TTS, Clerk. 
January 19, 1943. Writ of error and si1,persedeas awarded 
by the Court. Bond $2,500. 
l\L B. W. 
RECORD 
Pleas before the Honorable Willis D. MHler, Judge of 
the Law and Equity Court .of the City of Richmond, held 
for the said City at the Courtroom thereof in the City 
Hall on the 6th day of October, 1942. 
Be it remembei·ed that heretofore, to-wit: In the Clerk's 
Office of the Law and Equity C'ourt of the City of Richmond 
on the 6th day of July, 1940 : Came City of Richmond, by 
counsel, and filed its Notice of Motion for Judgment against 
Home Brewing· Company, Incorporated, which Notice of Mo-
tion for Judgment is in the words and fig-ures following, to-
wit: 
''Virginia: 
In the Law and Equity Court of the City of Richmond. 
City of Richmond, Plaintiff, 
v. 
Home Brewing Company, Incorporated, Defendant. 
Home Brewing Co., Inc., v. City of Richmond. 13 , 
NOTICE, OF MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ~OR TAXES. 
TO: 
Home Brewing Company, Inc., 
1125 West Clay Street, 
Richmond, Virginia. 
Please take notice that the undersigned City of Richmond, 
a municipal corporation of the .State of Virginia, by it~ at-
torney, will at 10 A. l\.f. on Monday, the 22nd day of July, 
1940, or as soon thereafter as the same may be heard; move 
the Law and Equity Court of the City of Richmond for a 
judgment against you for taxes due the City of Richmond 
in the amount of one thousand one hundred and seventy-one 
& 53/100 ($1,171.53}, with interest upon $1,113.00, a 
page 2 ~ part thereof, at six per centum per annum from the 
first day of June, 1940, until paid, together with 
the costs of this proceeding. Said sum of $1,171.53, together 
with interest as aforesaid, is now justly due by you and un-
paid to the City of Richmond on account of license taxes 
assessed ag·ainst you by the Commissioner of the Revenue 
for the City of Richmond for the years and in the amounts 
as shown ·upon the statements thereof attached hereto and 
filed herewith as exhibit '' A". 
State of Virginia, 
CITY OF RICHMOND, 
By HORACE H. EDWARDS, 
City Attorney. 
City of Richmond, To-wit: 
This day personally appeared ,J. M. Miller before me, E. 
B. Redford, a Notary Public in and for the :City afore said, 
who by me being first duly sworn, made oath as follows: 
That the said J. M. Miller is the Comptroller of the City of 
Richmond, and for many years prior to July 1st, 1940, was 
Deputy Comptroller, and as such Comptroller is charged with 
the duty of enforcing claims for City license taxes and is 
familiar with the books and records of his office which show 
unpaid items of City 1icense taxes; that he has examined the 
books and records of his office, and according to them there 
is now justly due unto the City of Richmond by Home Brew-
ing Company, Incorporated, a City license tax for each of 
the license tax years 1936, 1937, 1938, 1939 and 1940 
13age 3 ~ of $200.00 and penalty and interest, as follows : 
\ 
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Taxes 
Penalty and interest assessed 
Additional penalty 







together with interest upon $1,113.00, a part there·of, at six 
per centum per annum from June 1, 1940, until paid, as shown 
by attached bills. 
,J. M. MILLER, Affi.ant. 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 3rd day of July, 
1940. 
My commission ·expires on the 10th day of August, 1940. 
I 
. ' 
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EXHIBIT A. 
page 4 ~ 1939 CITY OF RICHMOND, VA. 9693 BUSINESS LICENSE 





Address 1125 W. Clay. 
The above Licensee is hereby authorized to 
conduct the business or profession hereinafter 




Barber Shop I Beauty Parlor 
0 ~ Beverages 











Bottler Soft Drinks 





INTEREST AT RATE OF 
6% WILL BE ADDED IF NOT PAID 
WITHIN 30 DAYS FROM DATE OF 
ASSESSMENT. 
NOTICE MAILED 
Date DEC 20 1939 
By R.R. 
200 00 
TOTAL 200 00 
JCP. 
This Copy to be filed 
10 00 in the 
37 80 ComptroJler's 
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page 5 ~ 1939 CITY OF' RICHMOND, VA. 9694 BUSINESS LICENSE 
Licensee Home Brewing Co. lcp 
Trading as 




The above Licensee is heJ"eby authorized to 
conduct the business or profession hereinafter 















Bottler Soft Drinks 




INTEREST AT RA'.J;E OF 
6% WILL BE ADDED IF NO'il'·.PAID 
WITHIN 30 DAYS FROM •DATE OF 
ASSESSMENT: I• 
) :. ,· 
NOTICE MAILl!:D 
Date DEQ 20 1939 
By R.R. 
200 00 
TOTAL 200 00 
JCP. 
This Copy" to be filed 
10 00 in the 
25 20 Comptroller's , 
235 20 Office 
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page 6 ~ 1938 CITY OF RICHMOND, VA. 
. Licensee Home Brewing Co. 
Trading as 
Address 1125 W. Clay. 
The above Licensee is hereby authorized to 
conduct the business or profession hereinafter 





~ Beauty Parlor 
~ Beverages 
~ 
..:I Cleaning and Pressing 
~ t1 Contractors 




















TOTAL 200 00 
HRMJr. 
See testimony 
ns to error in date 
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~e 7 ~ 1939 CITY OF RICHMOND, VA. 6995 BUSINESS LICENSE 
Licensee Home Brewing Co. 
Trading as 
Address 1125 W. Clay. 
The above Licensee is hereby authorized to 
conduct the business or profession hereinafter 
specified for the Calendar Year 1939. 
OCCUPATION 
Auto Repair 
Auto W ash-Polishing~Greasing 
Barber Shop 
























HET TOTAL 200 00 
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page 8 r 
LICENSE 
TAX YEAR 
NOTICE OF ASSESSMENT 
of Omitted or License 
Taxes Due the 
BUSINESS NO. 306 
LICENSE 
City of Richmond, Va. LICENSE TAX YEAR 
DATE OF ASSESSMENT 3/18/40 
Licensee Home Brewing Co. Inc No. 306 
Trading as 
Address 1125 W. Clay St. 
IF TIDS ASSESSMENT BE NOT PAID INTO THE CITY 
TREASURY WITHIN THIRTY DAYS AFTER ITS DATE, 
INTEREST AT THE RATE OF SIX PER CENTUM PER 
ANNUM WILL ACCRUE THEREON, FROM THE DATE OF 
SUCH ASSESSMENT UNTIL PAYMENT. 




Sect #70 200 00 
PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY 
OF SECTIONS 167, 167 (A) TOTAL TAXES 200 00 
AND 167 (B) OF CHAPTER 
10, RICHMOND CITY CODE PENALTY 10 00 
OF 1937, AS AMENDED BY 
ORDINANCE APPROVED INTEREST 
AUGUS'f 17, 1939, THE 
ABOVE LICENSE TAXES TOTAL 
FOR THE LICENSE TAX ASSESSMENT 210 00 
YEAR SHOWN ABOVE, 
TOGETHER WITH PEN- INTEREST FOR 
ALTIES AND INTEREST, FAILURE TO PAY 
IF ANY, HA VE BEEN WITHIN 30 DAYS 
ASSESSED BY ME. AFTER DATE OF 
ASSESSMENT 





March , 19 
JOHN C. GOODE 
Commissioner of Revenue 
This Copy to be filed 
in the 
Comptroller's Office 
for the City of Richmond, TOTAL 
Virginia 
BY M. P. Ganzert 
20 
FORM F 171 
page 9} 
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. 
REPORT OF CITY FIELD AUDITOR 
Classification Bottler Soft Drinks 
Section 70-Chapter 10 
Name Home Brewing Company, Inc. 
Omitted *** Office report 
Additional 
Basis Reported 
Additional Basis per Audit 
Audited Basis 
Tax Liability Bottler soft drinb, 
Tax Paid 
Additional Tax Due 
Penalty 5% 
Interest at 6% from Dec. 15 
of omitted year to _____ ·---
Address 1125-W Clay Street 
LICENSE YEARS 




210.00 Additional Amount Due 
Date 2-29-40-R R TOTAL ADDITIONAL AMOUN1, DUE$ 
page 10 ~ And at another day, to-wit: A.t a Law -and 
Equity Court. of the City of Richmond, held the 
22nd day of July, 1940. 
City of Richmond, plaintiff, 
against · 
Home Brewing Company, Incorporated, defendant. 
MOTION. 
This day came the plu.intiff and defendant by counsel and 
on the motion of the plaintiff by its attorney it is ordered 
that this case be dockefod. 
Horuc Brewing Co., Inc., V:· City of Richmond. 21· 
The defendant then filed herein a counter-affidavit and 
pleaded "non assu,mpsit" and put itself upon the Country 
and the plaintiff likewise. 
Virginia: 
In the Law and Equity Co:nrt of the City of Richm~nd. 
City of Richmond 
v .. 
Home Brewing Company, Incorporated. 
AFFIDAVIT BY DEFENDANT. 
State of Virg·inia, 
City of Richmond, to-wit: 
This day personally appeared George J. Bernier before 
me, Wm. C. Butler a Notary Public in and for the City and 
State aforesaid, who being by me first. duly sworn, made oath 
. as follows : · That the said George J. Bernier is 
page 11} Secretary-Treasurer of the Home Brewing Com-. 
pany, Incorporated, and as such has full authority 
to make this affidavit on behalf of the above defendant in 
the above entitled cause; and that the plaintiff, through its 
duly authorized officers and/or agents, erroneously assessed 
license taxes ag·ainst the said defendant for the yea1·s 1936, 
1937, 19·38, 1939 and 1940; and that the plaintiff is not en-
titled, as the affiant verily believes, to recover anything from 
the defendant on the claim set forth in the Notice of Motion 
for Judgment :filed in the above cause. 
GEORGE tl. BERNIE.R, Affiant. 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 22nd day of July, 
1940. 
lVIy commission expires on the 19th day of June, 1943. 
WM. C. BUTLER., 
Notary Public. 
My Commission Expires ,Tune 19, 1943 .. 
And at anotl1er day, to-wit: At a Law and Equity Court 
of the City 0f Richmond, held the 31st day. of July, 1940. 
22 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. 
This day came the defendant, by counsel, and by leave of 
Court filed herein a statement of the grounds of their defense 
to this action. 
page 12 ~ Virginia: 
In the Law and Equity Court of the City of Richmond. 
City of Richmond 
v. 
Home Brewing Company, Incorporated. 
GROUNDS OF DEF,ENSE. 
The defendant, by its attorney, comes and says that it is 
not liable to the plaintiff in the above styled case as alleged 
in the Notice of Motion for Judgment ii1ed herein, and for 
its grounds of defense assigns the followiI!g, among other 
grounds: 
1. That the defendant is a manufacturer of carbonated 
beverages, and is requir,~d to and has paid a tax on its capi-
tal to the State of Virginia, by reason of which, under the 
provisions of the laws of the State of Virginia, it is not liable 
to the plaintiff for a license tax of any kind. 
2. That the plaintiff has no authority under the laws of 
the State of Virgfoia to assess, or cause to be assessed, any 
license taxes against the defendant, and that the licensP taxes 
referred to in said Notice of Motion for Judgment 'lre in..: 
valid. 
3. That the H~ense taxes ref erred to in the said Notice of 
Motion for Judgment were erroneously assessed against the 
def end ant. 
4. That the plaintiff's officers or agents assessed license 
taxes against the defendant for the years 1936 and 1937 with-
out the required authority of an ordinance to do so. 
5. That this Court, b:v reason of an order entered against 
the plaintiff. on the 14th dav of December, 1934, under the 
nrovisions of which tlui nlaintiff waq re'wirerl to· rr:~f11nd n 
license tax assessed against the Richmond Orange Cnish 
Bottlinp: -Corporation, did rule that the plaintiff was with-
out authoritv to assess the license tax referrerl to in t11e 
Notice of Motion for Judgement a~rnh1st ma1mfaetnrers of 
carbonated heverag-es. and for th~t r.eason thn 
page 13 r prior judgment OT tl,iR Court nre~]ude~ anv rC?-
covery by the plaintiff. froin this defendant: 
Home Brewing Co., Inc., v. City of Richmond. 23 
The defendant reserves the right to amend these grounds 
of defense as and when it may be so advised. 
July 30, J.940. 
HOME BREWING COMP ANY, 
INCORPORATED, 
By C. V. "\VERNE, Counsel. 
And at another day, to-wit: At a Law and Equity Court 
of the City of Richmond, held the 25th day of October, 1940. 
This day came the plaintiff and defendant by counsel and 
neither party demanding a jury for the trial of this case but 
ag-reeing that all matters of law and fact might be heard and 
determined and judgment rendered by the -Court; and the evi-
dence and arguments of counsel having been heard, and the 
Court not now being advised of its opinion and judgment to 
be rendered herein, time is taken to consider thereof. 
And at another day, to-wit: At a Law and Equity Court 
of the City of Richmond, held the 30th day of April, 1942. . 
This day came again plaintiff and defendant, by counsel, 
. and neither party demanding a jury for the trial 
page 14 ~ of this case but agreeing that all matters of law 
and fact might be heard and determined and judg·-
ment rendered by the Court; and the evidence having been 
heard and the Court not now being advised of its judgment 
to be rendered in this proceeding, time is taken to consider 
thereof. 
page 15 ~ And now at this day, to-wit: At a Law and 
Equity Court of the City of Richmond, held the 
6th day of October, 1942. 
This day again came the defendant, by its attorney, and 
tendered to the Court its certificates of exceptions Nos. 1 and 
2, respectively, and reouested the Court to sig-n and au-
thenticate the same, which said certificates the Court doth 
sign and the same are made a part of the record in this case, 
all this 6th day of October, 1942. 
24 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. 
Virginia: 
·In the Law & Equity Court of the City of Richmond. 
Ci~y of Richmond, Plaintiff, 
v. 
Home Brewing -Company, Inc., Defendant. 
CERTIFICATJD OF EXCEPTION NO. 1. 
I certify that the following evidence and exhibits on be-
half of the plaintiff and defendant, respectively, as herein-
after denoted, is all the evidence and exhibits that were in-:-
troduced at the trial of this case. 
page 16 ~ Virginia: 
In the Law & Equity Court of the City of Richmond. 
City of Richmond 
v. . 
Home Brewing Company, Inc. 
Transcript of testimony and other incidents in the trial 
of the above styled case before the Hon. Willis D. Miller; 
Judge of said court, on the 30th day of April, 1942. 
Appearances: Henry R. Miller, Jr., Esq., Asst. City At-
torney, counsel for plaintiff. C. Victor Werne, Esq·., counsel 
for defendant. 
Mr. Miller: If Your Honor please, there are three cases 
on the docket involving similar facts and identical questions 
of law. One is the case of City of Richmond v. Home Brew-
ing· Company, Inc., the secon<t is City of Richmond v. Seven-
Up Bottling Company, lnc., and the third is the case of City 
of Richniond v. Dr. Pepper Bottlin,q Coinipany of Richmond, 
Inc. Each of these cases stands on a notice of motion for 
judgment for the taxes assessed against the defendants as 
bottlers of soft drinks--city license taxes. I would be glad 
to try all three of them together. I suggest, however, that 
we proceed in one and hear the evidence in that and have an 
understanding that after proving the assessments in the other 
two cases the facts will be the same. I see no reason now 
. why that stipulation could not be made, but per-
page 17 ~ haps it would be well to leave that until the first 
case is heard. 
I• 
Home Brewing Co., Inc., v. City of Richmond. 25 · 
Ralph O. A·ustin. 
. The Court: Apparently that is all right. I will let them 
stand as separate cases, but I don't see why if the proof is 
siinilar, except the amount of the taxes and names of the de-
fendants, why we could not hear one ~nd then counsel stipu-
late that with the exception of the difference in the sums 
claimed to be owing, which we can arrive at by testimony 
or stipulation, that the facts proven in the first one be the 
same facts in the next two. If that is agreeable to all parties, 
I am ready to hear them. 
Mr. Werne: I think that would .be agreeable with this one 
exception, that one of these compani_es was not in business 
when this litigation originally started; that. is, the assess-
ments originally made, and if that fact · can be taken care 
of-
The Court: You all can probably stipulate on that. 
RALPH 0. AUSTIN, 
a witness introduced in behalf of the plaintiff, being· first 
duly sworn; testified as follows: , 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By ]\fr. Miller: 
Q. Please state your name and occupation. 
A. Ralph 0. Austin; deputy Commissioner of the Revenue 
of the City of Richmond. 
Q. How 1011.g have you been in that office? 
page 18 r A. .Since January, 1934. 
Q. Have vou heen a deputy Commissioner of' 
the Revenue since then? 
. A. Yes. 
Q. Are you familiar with the records in your office with 
respect to the assessment of city license taxes Y 
A. I am. 
Q. Have you the file with respect to the assessment of 
citv license taxes against Home Brewing Company, Inc.? 
A. I have before me a license tax assessment made again~t 
the Home Brewing Company for the years 1936, 1937, 1938, 
1939 and 1940. 
Q. What is the amount of the license tax assessed for each 
of those years Y 
A. The license tax is at $200.00 each. 
Q. Do the assessments which you have embrace penalties 
and interest and, if so, please state the total amount of the 
penalties and interest embraced in the assessments? 
26 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. 
R£tlph 0. A.1tstin. 
A. The total o'f penalties and interest on the assessments °l 
Q. Yes. 
A. $113.00. 
Q. Were those assessments all made in regular course pur-
suant to law, according to the records of your office! 
A. According to the City Code, you mean T 
Q. I do not mean for you to pass on the question of law, 
but were the assessments regularly made in your office? 
A. These assessments. were regularly made, yes, 
page 19 ~ by deputies in t~e office. 
By Mr. Werne: 
Q. Did you say the assessments and interest were $113.00 Y 
A. No; the penalties and interest. 
By the Court : 
Q. How many years was it f 
A. Five years. 
Q. Then the total amount is $1,113.00f 
A. Yes. 
By Mr. Werne: 
Q. Didn't you say the first assessment was 1936¥ 
A. The first assessm(mt was for the year 1936. 
By the Court : . 
I ! 
Q. And then ·this total 3:mount which amounts to $1,113.00 
is for 1936,- 1937, 19'38 and 1939? 
A. And HMO. Five years at $200.00 each; that is $1,000.00. 
Q. Plus the penalties and interest? 
A. On each one that is $50.00 and the interest on 1936 and 
'37 is $63.00, which makes $113.00. 
By Mr. Miller: 
Q. Those assessment$ bear additional interest, do they not, 
from certain time~ witb respect to each assessment Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q .. Have yon a statement which has computed the interest 
due up to June 1, 1940, and, if so, please state the amount of 
thatY 
page 20 ~ A. Do you want them separately? 
Q. Just the total sum. 
A. Additional interest at 6% to .June 1. 1940, $58.53. 
Q. So that the total amount due as of June 1, 1940, was 
$1,171.531 
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A. $1,171.53 is right. 
Q. And $1,113.00 thereof bears interest from June 1, 1940, 
until paidY 
.A. Yes. 
Q. It bears interest at 6'7'0 per annum from June 1, l!l40, 
until paid? 
.A. },rom June 1, 1940. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Werne: 
Q. Mr. Austin, what year were these assessments made? 
.A. The 1936 assessment was made December 16, 1939; the 
1937 assessment was made December 16, 1939; the 1938 as-
sessment was made January 25, 1938; the 1939 assessment 
was made May 9, 1939; the 1940 assessment was made March 
18, 1940. 
Q. Now, according to your record, none of those assess-
ments was made during the y~ar in whic.h the tax was pay-
able, was it 1 
.A. Yes, sir; the 1938 assessment was made on January 25th 
of that year-
Q. When? 
.A. January 25th of the same year; the 1939 assessment 
was made May 9th of the same year; the 1940 as-
pag·e 21 r sessment was made in March of 1940. . 
Q. Filed with this notice of motion were memo-
randums of the amounts claimed for the various years and 
on those memorandums there is endorsed or impressed with 
a rubber stamp the statement: "Notice mailed December 
20, 1939, covering· 1936 tax.'' What is the meaning of that? 
.A. That is something stamped in the office of the Bureau 
of License Inspection. Probably when Mrs. Ryan comes on 
she can answer that question; I think it l1as her initials on 
it. 
Q . .As I understand your records, however, the taxes for 
the years 1936 and '37 were not assessed until after ,Janu-
ary 1, 1938; is that correct¥ 
.A. They were assessed after 1.938, yes, sir; they were as-
sessed in 1939. 
Q. For tbe years 1936 and '37 the assessments were not 
made in those years, were they 1 
.A. No, sir ; made in 1939. 
Q. Ca11 you tell why they were not made then f 
.A. The only information I have is that the assessments for 
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the taxes herein were made on information received from 
the City License Bureau and that is the notation on those 
assessments when they were made, that the information came 
from the City License Bureau. 
Q. Do you know why that inf o:rmation came; why the as-
sessments were not made in those years 1 Do your records 
show that tho Home Brewing· Company had. been 
page 22 ~ assessed for taxes prior to 1938. in any way at all? 
Mr. Miller: If Your Honor please, if he means to have 
the witness testify as to ass~ssments made prior to J anu-
ary 1, 1936, I object for the reason that assessments that 
might be made prior to January 1, 1936, are in no way in-
volved in this proceeding. The first license tax claimed in 
_the proceeding is for the year 1936. 
The Court: I think he was directing the question at why 
the 19·36 assessment was not made in 1936. 
Mr. W erne: Yes, sir. 
Mr. Miller: I thought the .question was do you know 
whether they had eyer heeri assessed with any tax prior to 
1938. 
The Court: I understood this witness to say that for the 
year 1936 the assessment was made in either 1938 or '39 and 
that Mr. Werne inquired of him why the assessment of 1936 
was not actually made as of the year 1936. That question is 
permissible. The mattec· of asking him why he did not assess 
for 1932 or '34 is not in issue here and is irrelevant and I ex-
clude it, but he can ask him why he did not actually assess 
1936 and actually assess 1937 in those years, which it appears 
was not done. 
Mr. Miller: May Mr. Williams read his last question? 
Note: Question read. 
page 23 ~ The Court: The objection is sustained in so far 
as the question involves prior to 1936. 
By Mr. Werne: 
· Q. Can you explain why assessments were not made for 
the years 1936 and '37 during those years 1 
·A. Mr. Werne, the only information I have is from the 
records. I would take it that the requests were not made 
and therefore when th,~y had been omitted they were made 
at tl1is time. 
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Q. Do your records show that the Home Brewing Com-
pany had been in business· during those years Y 
A. I don't know how to answer that except personally. 
I know the Home Brewing Company has been in business for 
a long time. 
Q. How many years do you know they have been in busi-
ness? -
. A. .As bottlers of beverages since the return of alcoholic 
drinks. I don't know personally whether they started to 
making-
Q. You know then they have been in business for a num-
ber of years prior to the time these assessments were made Y 
A. Yes, sir. . 
Q. Your office simply makes the assessment based on the 
information furnished bv the· License Bureau Y 
A. In this case, yes. " 
Q. Is that true in the case of all the bottlers f 
A. No, sir. We have records, of course, of the bottlers in 
Richmond and we make up the licenses in January of each 
year for the bottlers of· soft drinks under sec-
pag·e 24 } tion 70. 
Q. Mr. Austin, I am going to hand you two pa-
pers here that seem to be carbon copies of forms furnished 
with the notice of motion. On those forms appears the state-
ment at the head "1938 '' on both of them and then the as-
sessment was made for bottlers of beverages for 1936 and 
'37. That indicates that those assessments for 1936 and '37 
were made in 1938; is that correct? 
A. Mr. Werne, these relate to a matter other than the one 
we are trying here ; different names on them. 
Q. It is the same company and same year, isn't it? 
A. We are working· on the Home Brewing -Company and 
vou have another name there. That does not read Home 
Brewing Company. · 
Q. I understand that, but that is the same company, isn't 
it; $200.00 for the assessment? 
A. Same amount, but we are not wo;rking on the Beauf ont 
Company. 
Q. Wasn't the Beaufont name changed over to the Home 
Brewing Company after this assessment was made? 
A. I don't know anything about that. 
Q. Mr. Austin, isn't it the duty of the office of the ·Com-
missioner of the Revenue to make assessments for license 
taxes for each year in which they are due? 
A. Yes, sir. 
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Q. I think you stated a moment ago that regardless of in-
formation furnished by the License Bureau of the City, the 
.Commissioner of the :a~venue also makes assessments? 
· .. · A. That is right. · 
page 25 t Q. YOU still do not know why the assessments 
for the ·years prior to 1938 were not made? 
A. No, sir, I do not. 
Q. Do you know whnther any instruction had been re-
ceived from the City Lfoense Bureau to make the assessment 
prior to 1938? 
A. Apparently not. I don't know of any. 
Q. Then the first action that was taken on the years 1936 
and '37 was by the Commissioner in 1938 without any in-
struction from the City; is that correct 1 
A. They were made in 1938 by the Commissioner of the 
Revenue's office. 
Q. And that was done without any instruction from the 
City? 
A. Without any request from the License Bureau. 
Q. And you say you don't know why these assessments 
were not made for those years 1936 and '37 before they were 
made¥ 
A. I do not. 
RE-DIR1!1CT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Miller: 
Q. Mr. Austin, here is the original notice of motion with 
the exhibits referred to therein which purport to be copies 
of the bills as to which you have testified. Will you look 
at those exhibits and sue if they are copies .of the. records of 
your of :£ice Y 
A. Mr. Miller, there is ouly one slight difference I see. 
This is a penciled copy, not the original, and thev have the 
wrong date on this one. .. 
page 26 ~ Q. The wrong date 0/ 
A. Yes, on the copy. 
Q. Will you explain the difference between the two Y 
A. Here is the original made January 25, 1938, and in 
making the copy with a pencil they made it dated May 9th. 
This is a pencil copy, not tbe original. 
Q. Which is the correct date? 
A. This date is January 25, 1938. 
Q. And that relates to the 1938 a~sessmenU 
A. Yes. 
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The Court: Will you mark that exhibit with your initials 
so I will know which it is that has the wrong date on it i . 
}fr. Miller: It is bill No .. 3572. 
The Witness: In making the copy someone put the wrong 
date. 
l\fr. Miller: May I put on here: '' See testimony as tp error 
in date"? · 
The Court: Yes. 
RE-CROSS EXAl\HNATION. 
By Mr. Werne: 
Q. Mr. Austin, tlle office of the Commissioner of the Reve-
nue made these assessments. ,,rm you tell us on what au-
thorization the assessments were made? 
.A. The· assessments were made on the authority 
· page 27 ~ of the City Code, Chapter 10, omitted licenses. 
Q. Do you know what section! 
A. I could find it in the Code; I don't remember the num-
ber just at this moment. 
Q. Is that Section 70 of Chapter 10? 
.A. This is the section under which the licenses were is-
sued. 
Q. Will you read iU 
A. "l\fanufacturing bottling establishments-
The Court: That is what clrnpterf 
Mr. Werne: Chapter 10. Section 70. 
Mr. Miller: May I add he is reading from the ordinance 
approved December 17,· 1937. amending Chapter 10 of the 
Richmond Citv Code for 1937 in so far as it applies to Sec-
tion 70 thereof. 
The Witness: Shall I read the ordinance approved De-
cember 17th? 
Mr. Miller: ,Sectiou 70 is sufficient . 
.A. ( coutinued) '' Manufacturing bottling establishments. 
Persons, firms or corporations eng·aged in the business of 
manuf acturinJ~' and bottlirnt soft drinks, mineral and or 
aeratecl waters, either or all. $200.00. not prorated.'' 
Q. Yon ·are reading; from the -City Code, are you not? 
A.· Richmond City Code. 
Mr. Miller: I will prove that if you are worried about it. 
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page 28 ~ By Mr. Werne: · 
Q. That ordinance was amended on what dateY 
'A. December 17, 1937. 
Q. And became effective as of what date¥ 
Mr. Miller: If Your Honor please, I do not object to this, 
but this· witness is probably not so well qualified about that 
as the lawyers or the Court. The ordinance speaks for itself 
and shows the date it was effective. I am going to introduce 
the ordinance. 
Mr. Werne: I withdraw it .. 
Witness stood asid~. 
MRS. RHEA RYAN, 
a witness introduced in behalf of the plaintiff,. being first 
duly sworn, testified as follows : 
DIRECT E,XAMINATION. 
By Mr. Miller: 
Q. Pleal?e state your name and ~ccupation. . 
A. Mrs. Rhea Ryan; deputy license inspector, License Bu-
reau of the City of Richmond. . 
Q. How long have you been so employed t 
· A. Seventeen years in this particular position. 
Q. Are you familiar with the records in your office with 
respect to tl1e assessment of license taxes ag·ainst 
page 29 ~ the Home Brewing Company, Inc. Y 1 
· A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Are you. familiar with the license taxes involved in this 
proceeding f 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Are they unpaid and due to the City? 
A. They are. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. We1·ne: 
Q. Under what authority were those licenses assessed T 
A. Section 70 of Chapter 10 of the Richmond City Code 
1md authority vested in the duties and powers of the License 
Inspector and Commissioner of the Revenue. 
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Q. Included in this suit are claims for the years 1936, '37, 
'38, '39 and '40. Can you tell in wha.t year the assessments 
for the taxes for 1936 and '37 were made? 
Mr. Miller: If Your Honor please, is there any reason 
for expanding the record to that extent. The exhibits are 
there and it has been testified over and over again when those 
assessments were made. 
The Court I don't see any necessity, but ·he can get it in 
again if he wants to. 
Mr .. Werne: If Your Honor please, the purpose of that is 
to show that they made assessments for taxes-
The Court: I understa1'1d the purpose, but I 
page 30 J think the other witness testified to it and. it is not 
contradicted. It is. just cumulative. You can have 
it if you want it, but_:! would have to take what Mrs. Ryan 
is about to say is exactly what Mr. Austin has said and I 
suppose Mr. Miller w~uld concede it, but let her answer it. 
A.. The 1936 assessment on the Home Brewing Company, 
Inc., for the year 1936 was assessed December 16, 1939, and 
the notice was mailed on December 2oth to the taxpayer by 
the License Bureau. 
Q. That was for the year 1936! 
A.. For the year 1936. 
Q. And in what year was the 1937 assessment made? 
A. The year 1937 tax was assessed by the Commissioner 
of the ];tevenue on December 16, 1939, and the memorandum 
notice was mailed to the taxpayer· on December 20, 1939, by 
the License Bureau. 
Q. Now each of the taxes in the following years were as-
sessed, according to your records, during the years in which 
they we_re payable-1938, '39 and '40? 
A. The year 1938 was assessed ,January 25, 1938, the year 
in which the tax was due; the year 1939 was assessed May 
9, 1939, the year in which the tax was due; the year 1940 
was assessed March 18, 1940, the year in which the tax was 
due. 
Q. Now can you explain why the assessments were not 
made in 1937 and '37 f 
page 31 ~ A. The Home Brewing- Company had the privi-
. lege in each year to come down and apply for their 
own license tax. They did not avail themselves of that privi-
lege. Information and investigation of the Bureau revealed 
. after the books were compl.eted that they were delinquent. 
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The license code gives the City the right to assess for the 
thre¢ back years and the then current year on omitted taxa-
tion or ·a.elinquent taxation. The City availed itself of that 
privilege in making the assessments against the Home Brew-
ing Company. 
Q. You are familiar with the assessment and collection of 
taxes against the bottlers of carbonated beverages by the 
City, aren't yolJ t · 
A. Will you repeat thaU 
Q. You are familiar with the assessment and collection of 
taxes on bottlers of carbonated beverages by the City? 
A. I am familiar with the collection of all license taxes by 
the City. 
Q. Now haven't you fosti:fied in another case in connection 
with this same tax against bottlers of. carbonated beverages 
under Section 70 of Chapter 10¥ 
A. Yes. 
Q. And didn't you testify in that case that the reason the 
assessment had not been made was because-
. page 32 ~ Mr. Miller: I object, if Your Honor please. 
This witness was put on the stand for the sole 
purpose of proving the question of whether the tax was· paid 
or not. 
The Court: Let me hear the question. Finish it. Don't -
answer it yet. 
By l\fr. W erne : 
Q. Didn't you testify in that case that the reason the as-
sessment had not been made was because you had notice from 
the City Attorney's offi<!e that a decision had been rendered 
against that ordinance Y 
The Court: Objection sustained. She can answer it for 
the record. 
Mr. Vlerne: Exception. 
The Court: You can answer it now. 
A. I did and that is correct. 
Q. You say that is correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now what was the reason then that the assessments 
were not made in 1936 and '37? 
A. Well, in 1936 and '37, as I have stated, there was an 
opinion rendered. However, after the matter was discussed 
Home Brewing Co., Inc., v. City of Richmond. 35 
Mrs. Rhea Ryan. 
with the City Attorney's office and gone into more thoroughly 
it was decided that the previous ordinance that we had· was 
valid and we had the rig·ht to make the back assessments un-
. der the Code and we took advantage of it. 
page 33 r Q. YOU say the previous ordin~nce 'f 
A. Se.etion 70 was amended, I think, in 1937, but 
we had a section covering the classification of bottlers prior 
to that. 
Q. So then the authority on which you made the assess-
ments for 1936 and '37 and for the subsequent years was un-
der the amended ordinance of December, 1937. Is that cor-
rect? And it became effective in Jan-qary! 
Mr. Miller: I object, if Your Honor please. 
The Court: Objection sustained. She can answer it for 
the record. She said it was amended, but after considera-
tion they had come to the conclusion they had the right to 
assess for the 1936 and '37 taxes as the ordinance stood in 
those ye&rs, thoug·h it was amended in 1937. I don't think 
she meant the 1937 ordinance made it retroactive and that 
thev collected or assessed the 1936 and '37 taxes under the 
ordinance as it was passed in Hl37, but they had come to the 
conclusion that as the old ordinance stood they had a right 
to collect fol' 1936 and '37 and thon for 1938 under the new 
ordinance, but under each ordinanc~ they had a right to col-
lect. I think that is what she meant. I will let her answer 
it over again. 
Mr. W erne : I understood her to sav after conference-
Tbe Court: Explain that oVier again, though 
page 34 r this is subject to Mr. Miller's objection which the 
Court has sustained as asking this lady to pass 
upon a proposition of law. 
A. I said there was a decision rendered in the case of 
bottlers, but after we. took the matter up witl1 the Law De-
partment and it was thoroughly discussed and gone into it 
was decided that t11e ordinance that we had prior to the 
ordinance of 1937 was valid and under either ordinance the 
license was correctly assessed. 
By the Court: 
Q. That had been a decision rendered in another tax case 
of similar character, but not as against this particular bottler f 
A. That is correct. 
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The Court: I think that was a decision rendered· by Judge 
Pollard, then judge of this court. 
By Mr. Werne: · 
Q. Now as a result of that decision did your office receive 
any instructions relating to the assessment of taxes T 
A. Instructions from whom t ·· . 
Q. From the head of the department or froin 'the City At-
torney's office. 
A. The assessments were made at the request of the head 
of the License Bureau and the Commissioner of the Revenue 
after he had b_ee_n fully advised in the matter. 
Q. But you had been instructed not to make any 
page 35 ~ asses_s;m~i:i,t, had you not, prior to the time that 
the ordinance was amended? · 
A. We dicl not. · · · · 
Q. Then you simply i1c}~~ ~~ the information you had re-
garding that decision in another case deali~g with this same . 
ordinance and that was the reason the 1936 and '37 taxes were 
not assessed in -those years. Is that correcU 
A. Well, during that time thaf- tlie assessments were not 
made there was a question as to this decision having been 
rendered, but the department was never satisfied with the 
decision and went out and made a very thorough investiga-
tion and then we broug·ht it to the attention ·of the Law· De-
partment again and after we got their instructions on both 
ordinances we had the assessments made at the request of the· 
Bureau. · · Q. That decision was in this same court, wasn't it 1 
· A. I think so. · ·· · , 
Q. And it was by Judge Robert N. Pollard; is that correctf 
A. I think so. I am not very familiar with it. 
Q. That decision was against tho City of Richmond! 
A. To the best of my knowledge, I think it was. 
Mr. Miller: I object to this1 witness testifying· as to that. 
The Court: Objection sustained. 
Mr. Werne: Exception. 
· Q. Do you know whether or not the City refunded any 
money. that had been previously paid by the Home Brewing 
Company as a result of that decision? 
page 36 ~ Mr. Miller: I object. 
The Court: Objection sustained. 
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Mr. W erne: EcX:ception. 
A. I think there were refunds made under the decision 
· of Judge Pollard. 
Q. -Now did the City take any appeal? 
Mr. Miller: May it be understood the objection applies 
to that entire line of testimony and the objection is sustained 
9n the ground that the record is the best evidence and, sec-
ondly, it is a question of law that the lady is asked to an-
:;;w~r. 
The Court: It may bring about a situation of stare decisiS', 
a decision by a court of competent jurisdiction in a similar 
matter and the Court will consider it in arriving at what 
ultimately will be done in this case, but as evidential matter 
the Conrt thinks it is inadmissible, though the witness can 
answer it for the record. 
Mr. Miller: May we have it understood in the record the 
9bjection is covering this entire line of testimony? 
The Court: Yes, I think that is all rig·ht. 
Mr. W ~rne: Yes, and I except to the ruling of the Cou:rt. 
Q. I asked if the City took an appeal from that decision. 
· A. I don't know, Mr. Werne. I don't think so. 
page 37 ~ Q. You don't think it did¥ 
A. No. 
Q: Do you know what case that involved Y 
A. Well, I am frank to say I don't know rig·ht now. If 
you state the case, I might recognize it. 
The Court: If you have it, you can refresh the witness. 
Mr. Werne: I would like to introduce in evidence at this 
time certified copies of the · petition and the order of this 
court in the case of Richmond Orange Crush Bottling Cor-
voration v. City of Richmond as a part of the record. 
Note: Filed and marked Exhibit "A''. 
Witness stood aside. 
Mr. Miller: I have no other evidence, except proof of the 
city ordinances. I tender to the Court a published copy of 
the City Code of 1937, a printed copy of the ordinances and 
. resolutions of the Council of the City of Richmond com-
mencing with the month of September, 1936, and endipg with 
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the month of August, Ht38, and the &ame character of v9lume 
for the period commencing with the month of September, 
1938, and ending with the month of August, 1940. 
Hei·e see Exhibits Nos. 2, 3 and 4. 
p~ge 38 }- The Court : Will you haye this particular Sec-
tioµ 70, I think, of Chapte~· 10 copied and plac~d 
in sheet form in the evidence-the ordinance as it existed 
prior to the amendmeu·t of rna7 a~d- after 19371 See Ex-
hibit No. 1. 
Mr. Miller: Yes, sir. l take it under the statute the ten-
der of those publishe¢1 volumes is s1.1fficient proof. 
The Court: Yes. They are admitted in evidence; but it is 
not necessary to put in the record the whole volume. 
Mr. Wern~: Al~ng with th~t I would like to have intrq-
duced as part of the reeord Chapter 10, Section 4 and Section 
62 of the Richmond City Code of 1924 as amended. 
J\fr. Miller: I object to that, if Your :aonor please, as be-
ing a matter entirely irrelevant to the issue~ in this case. 
The Code of 1924 in itself has no application here, unless it 
can be shown that there is some padicular provision in there 
that was in force in In36. 
Mr. Werne: That iB why I am asking this be introduced 
because that was the ordinance under which the Richmond 
Orange ·Crush Bottling case came up. 
The Court: ·when was the last amendment of that or-
dinance previous to the Orang·e Crush case? 
Mr. Werne: 1924. 
The Court: There was no amendment of it after 1924 until 
1937Y , 
Mr. Werne: Not until 1937. 
Mr. Mill~r: I beg· to djtf er with my f ri~ncl be-
page 39 r cause the Code of 1937 shows Section 70 wa& 
amended Decemb~r 24, 1930. I suggest we leave 
those matters to· be proven from the published ordinances. 
The Court: I will not pass on right now ·the admissibility 
of that tender in evidence. I will consider later on whethe·r 
I deem it in evidence. 
Mr. W erne: I want to get this ordinance in tlrn record. 
The -Court: I will let you get it in the record because even 
if it is excluded I will let you make it a pa rt of the record 
as evidenc~ offered the Court and excluded. If I ultimately 
decide it has no bearing on the case, you will g-et it in just . 
like yqu got Mrs. Ryan's testimony in to which I sustained 
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the objection. I am not going to keep you from making up 
your record. 
Mr. Werne: I will save the point on that. 
The Court: You have tendered it and I have not ruled on 
its a.dmissibility yet. If I rule it is inadmissible, you can ex-
cept and ·tender it and take a bill of exception on it. 
Mr. vVerne: :Now I would like to call the Clerk of this court 
to prove the endorsement on the original decree in the office 
of the Clerk of this court, subject to the City's objection 
already made. 
page 40 } LUTHER LIBBY, 
a witness introduced in behalf of the plaintiff be-
ing first duly sworn, testified as follows : 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By )ir. Miller: 
Q. Mr. Libby, you are the Clerk of this court, are you not? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you have the record in your hand of the case of 
Richmond Orange Crush Bottling Com,pany- v. Citg'· of Rich-
mond? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And I believe you have a certified copy of an order el_!-
tered in that proceeding which has been :filed as an exhibit 
in this case f 
A. Yes. . 
Q. Will you look on the original of that order and read to 
the Court the endorsement thereon by the counsel and the 
Judgef 
A. There are two orders entered as of the same day. Or:. 
der No. 1 docketing the petition is endorsed with the style 
of the case and "I ask for the entry of this. C. V. Werne, 
p. q. I have no objection to entry of this. James E. Cannon, 
City Attorney.'' 
Q. What is the date of that order? 
A. That is December 14, 1934; and the second order is in 
the handwriting· of the Judge of the court at that time; the 
style o-f the suit and endorsed: '' I ask for this. 
page 41 r C. V. Weme, p. q. Seen .• James E. Cannon, City 
Attorney. ]~nter. R. N. P., December 14, 1934." 
Q. R. iN. P. are the initials of the Hon. Robert N. Pollard, 
~ho was then Judge of this court? 
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A. Yes. 
Q. Is there anything in your office to indicate there were 
any exhibits or testimony in that matted Are there any 
copies of any exhibits <J 
A. No, this is the complete record; 
Mr. Werne: The order recites the witnesses appeared and 
testified. 
Mr. Miller: I just want to be sure the record shows no 
transcript of evidence :filed or exhibits or stipulation or ,any 
· matter of that sort in the record. 
The Witness : IN o, this is the entire record. 
By the Court: . 
Q. The petition and the two orders you have recited T 
A. Yes. The order recites that testimony was heard. 
By Mr. Miller: 
Q. The :first order simply docketing the matter Y 
A. Yes, docketin&' the petition. The second order entered 
the judgment, showmg· that evidence was heard from the wit-
nesses. 
Witness stood aside. 
page 42 ~ GEORGE J. BERNIE·R, 
a witness introduced in behalf of the defendant, 
being first duly sworn:- testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Werne: 
Q. State your full name and occupation. 
A. George J. Bernier; secretary and treasurer of the 
Home Brewing· Company. 
Q. How long· has the Home Brewing Company been en-
gaged in business in the City of Richmond f 
A. They have been engaged since .repeal as the Home Brew-
ing- Company, which was September, 1933. 
Q. What is the business of the company? 
A. Brewers of beer and bottlers of beer and soft drinks. 
Q. Bottlers of beer and soft drinks 1 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now do you manufacture these soft drinks t 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. As the secretary and treasurer of tl1e Home Brewing 
I 
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George J. Bernier. 
Company what are your duties with respect to the payment 
of taxes? 
A. Well, it is customary for me to take care of them and 
pay them when they become due. 
Q. And you are familiar with the payment of all tax· bills 
and items of that character Y 
.A. Yes, sir. . 
Q. Have you paid a.ny license tax to the City of 
page 4:3 ~ Richmond covering the bottling and manufacture 
of soft drinks ? .. 
A. No, sir. 
Mr. Miller: May I ask what years he limits the question 
to? 
By Mr. Werne: 
Q. How long has it been since you paid the tax? 
.A. Well, I imagine .way back in about 1934. . 
]\fr. Miller: I object to any statement that relates to as-
sessments prior to January 1, 1936. 
The Court: Objection sustained. 
]\fr. Werne: Exception. 
Q. Mr. Bernier, please state why your company did not 
pay this tax? 
A. The company did not pay this tax due ~o· the fact that 
they felt it was an erroneous assessment and that the court" 
passed a ruling· that it was an erroneous assessment and we 
were refunded in 1934 for taxes which we had paid. 
Q. You say the City refunded the tax in 1934? 
A. Yes, sir. 
I • 
l\Ir. Miller: I object to the statement as to the refund · 
and move the answer be stricken from the record. 
The Court: Objection sustained. 
Mr. W erne : Exception. 
Q. State how much that refund amounted to. 
page 44} l\fr. Miller: Same objection. 
The Court: Objection sustained. 
Mr. W erne: Exception. 
Q. It is stated by the plaintiff that your Company was not 
assessed for any tax during the years 1936 and 1937, but 
that assessments were made in 1938, 1939 and 1940 and that 
in 1938 assessments were also made for 1936 and '37. 
42 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. 
George J. Bernie·r. 
The Court: In 1939, the evidence was. 
Mr. W erne: Yes. I beg pardon. 
... 
Q. Did your company receive· a statement covering those 
taxes? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And your informati:on is or your company took the 
position because of the previous case involving the bottlers 
license tax you were not liable for those taxes and therefore 
did not pay them¥ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Now does your company pay a tax on its capital to the 
State of Virginia V 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. As a manufacturE!rf 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Do you pay any other tax to the City of Richmond t 
A. WelJ, we pay a brewer's license. 
Q. Do you pay any tax on equipment and ma-
page 45 ~ chinery ¥ 
A. Yes, sir, and on real estate. 
Q. -That is paid to the City, but you do pay a manufac-
turer's machinery tax! 
A. Yes, sir. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Miller: 
Q. Your company was engaged in the business of manu-
facturing and bottling· soft drinks in the City of Ric}lmond 
throughout 1936, '37, 'H8, '39 and '40, was it noU 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you pay a State license tax as a bottler of soft 
drinks for any or each of those years! 
A. State license? That I can't say offhand. I am not ex-
actlr sure on that. 
Mr. Werne: We will admit that they paid the State tax. 
Mr. Miller: Counsel for the defendant admits that the de-
fendant paid to the State of Virgfoia a State license tax as 
a manufacturer of bottled carbonated beverages under Sec-
tion 199 of the Tax Code o'f Virginia for each of the years 
1936, '37, '38, '39 and '40. Is that righU 
Mr. Werne: That is rigl1t, but ,ve do not admit the legality 
of that law. 
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By the Court: 
Q. You do not sell to consumers, do you? 
A. ·we sell to dealers--retail dealers. 
page 46 } Q. But not to the consumers 1 
A. ,No, sir. 
Witness stood aside. 
Testimony concluded. 
Note: It is stipulated by counsel for the parties herein 
that the exhibits attached to the original of the notice of 
motion for judgment in the case bearing docket number 6560 
in which Dr. Pepper Bottling Company of Hichmond, Inc., 
is defendant, and the exhibits in the similar notice of motion 
for judgment in the case bearing docket number 6563 in which 
Seven-Up Bottling Company, Inc., is defendant are correct 
copies of the origfoal assessments against the respective cor-
porations, and that the Dr. Pepper Bottling ·Company of 
Richmond, Inc., bas been assessed with City license taxes as 
a manufacturer and bottler of soft drinks for each of the. 
years 1936, '37, '38, '39 and '40, and that the said taxes so 
assessed, together ,vith penalties and inte1 .. est, and now re-
maining unpaid aggregate $1,195.91, together with interest 
upon $1,113.00, a part thereof, at 6% per annum from June 
1, 1940, until paid. 
That Seven-Up Bottling Company, Inc., was likewise as-
sessed with similar taxes for each of the years 19·37, '38, '39 
and '40, and which taxes, penalties and interest aggregate 
$929.14, together with interest upon $865.20, a part thereof, 
at 6% per annum from June 1, 1940, until paid. 
page 47 ~ That no part of either said amounts has been 
paid to the City of Richmond. 
That Dr. Pepper Bottling Company of Richmond, Inc., was 
engaged in the business of bottling and manufacturing· soft 
drinks in the City of Richmond throughout each of the years 
1936, '37, '38, '39' and '40 and was assessed by the State of 
Virginia with the ,State license tax as a bottler of carbonated 
beverages under Section 199 of the Tax Code of Virginia, 
and which tax ]ms heen paid to the State of Virginia. 
That Seven-Up Bottling Company, Inc., was likewise en-
gaged in such business throughout the years 1937, '38, '39 
and '40 and was likewise asse~sed with State license taxes 
for the said years, which State license taxes have been paid 
to the State of Virginia. . 
That each of said corporations was assessed with and has 
paid to the State of Virginia taxes upon its capital as manu-
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facturers, and was assessed with and has paid to the City 
of Richmond taxes upon the machinery and tools of such 
business. . 
That both corporations sell to licensed dealers and not to 
consumers. 
That all other evidence, including· exhibits and ordinances, 
subject to the objections and rulings of the Court and the 
exceptions thereto, that has been introduced in the case of 
City of Richmond v. Home Brewing· Company, Inc., is to be 
taken as introduced as evidence in each of these cases in so 
far as said evidence may be considered by either party to 
have any bearing upon the issues in these cases. · 
page 48 } EXTRACT FROM CHAPTER 10 OF THE RICH-




'' 4. There shall be levied and collected for the calendar 
year in 1931 and each calendar year thereafter, the following 
license taxes, to-wit: 
* * * 
"70. BOTTLING ESTABLISHMENTS.-Persons, firms 
or corporations engagod in the business of bottling soft 
drinks, mineral and/or aerated waters .... $200.00. Not pro-
rated (December 24, 1930). '' 
EXTRACT FROM OH.APTER 10, OF THE RICHMOND 
CITY CODE OF 1937 AS IT EXISTED AFTER THE 
AMENDMENT OF DECEMBER 17, 1937 . 
• • 
"70. MANUFACTURING AND BOTTLING ,ESTAB-
LISHMENTS.-Persons, firms and corporations engaged in 
the business of manufacturing and bottling soft drinks, min-
eral or aerated waters, either or all $200.00. Not prorated. 
(December 17, 1937.) '' 
Exhibit No. 1. 
W.D.M. 
Judge 
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page 49} AN ORDINANCE 
(Approved Aug-ust 17, 1939) 
To amend and reordain Section 167 of Chapter 10 of ·Rich-
mond City Code of 1937, concerning the levying of taxes 
and the assessment of licenses in relation to omitted li-
cense taxes, and to amend said Chapter 10 by the insertain 
of two new sections between sections 167, as amended, and 
section 168, to be known as · section 167-a, in relation to 
the assessment of additional license taxes, and section 
167-b, in relation to the assessment in cases of fraudulent 
intent or intent to evade· license taxes. 
Be it ordained by the Council of the City of Richmond: 
1. That section 167 of Chapter 10 of the Richmonq City 
Code of 1937, concerning the levying of taxes and the assess-
ment of licenses, be amended and reordained so as to read 
as follows: 
167. ASSESSMENT OF OMITTED LICENSE TAXES. 
-If the commissioner of the revenue or other assessing of-
ficer ascertains that any person, firm, or corporation has not 
been assessed with a license·tax levied in this chapter for any 
license tax y.ear of the three license tax ·years last past, or 
for the then current license tax year, and the absence of such 
assessment was not due to the fraudulent intent or intent to 
evade taxes on the part of said person, firm, or corporation, 
it shall be the duty of the commissioner of the revenue or 
other assessing officer, to assess the same with the proper 
license tax for the year or years so omitted, add-
page 50 ~ ing thereto the normal penalty or penalties and 
interest prescribed by law; and if the assessment 
be not paid into the city treasury within thirty days after 
its date, interest at the rate of six per centum per annum 
shall accrue thereon from the date of such assessment until 
payment. 
2. That Chapter 10 of the Richmond City Code of 1937, 
concerning the levying- of taxes and the assessment of license 
be amended by the insertion of two new sections between sec-
tion 167, as hereby amended, and section 168, to be known 
as section 167-a, in relation to the assessment of additional 
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license taxes, and 167 ..:b, in relation to the assessment in cases 
of fraudulent intent or intent to evade license taxes, which 
said new sections are to read as follows : 
167-a .. ASSESSMENT OF ADDITlONAL LICENSE 
T.A.XiES·.-;I.f the commissioner of the revenue or other assess-
ing· officer ascertains that any person, firm or corporation 
bas been regularly assossed with a license tax levied in this 
chapter for a~y license tax year of the three license tax 
years last past, or for the then current license tax year, but 
that upon a correct audit and computation of said license tax 
the assessment thereof should have been in an increased 
amount, and the assessment of said license tax in the lesser 
amount was not due to the fraudulent intent or intent to 
evade taxes on the part of said person, firm, or corporation, 
then said commissioner of the revenue or other assessing 
officer shall assess said taxpayer with the additional license 
tax or taxes found to be due. No penalty or interest shall 
be assessed upon said additional tax or taxes, provided the 
said additional tax or taxes be paid into the city treasury 
within thirty days after said assessment, but if said assess-
ment be not 1Jaid into the city treasury within said 
page 51 r thirty days, interest at the rate of six per centum 
per annum shall accrue thereon from the date of 
such assessment .until payment. 
167-b. ASSESSME~T IN CASES OF FRAUDULENT 
INTENT OR INTENT TO EV ADE LICE1NSE TAXES.-
If the commissioner of the revenue or other assessing officer 
ascertains that any person, firm, or corporation has fraudu-
lently, or with the intent to evade the payment of proper 
taxes, failed or refused to obtain a proper license as required 
by law, for any one or more of the three license tax years 
last past, or for the then current license tax year, and the 
liability therefor is aHcertained, such omitted or additional 
licE:nse tax or taxes and the normal penalty and interest pre-
scribed by law shall be assessed for each and everv year · of 
the three license tax years last past and of the thei1 cmn-ent 
license tax year, for which it was assessable, tog·ether with 
an ad4itiona1 penalty of one hundred per· centum of such 
unpaid tax or taxes, and the failure to obtain such li~ense 
as is required by law shall be taken as prima f acie evidence 
of an intent so to evade the taxes. If said assessment be 
not paid into the city treasury within thirty days after its 
date, interest at the rate of six :per centum per annum shall 
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accrue thereon from the date of such assessment until pay-
ment. 
3. This ordinance shall be in force from its passage. 
Exhibit No. 2. 
W.D.M. 
Judge 
page 52 ~ AN EXTRACT FROM CHAPTER 10 OF THE 
RICHMOND CITY CODE OF 1937. 
'' 1. There shall be levied and collected for the calendar 
year 1931 and each calendar year thereafter, the following 
taxes, to-wit: 
"{a) REAL ESTATE. * i' * 
'' (b) 1"IACHINERY AND TOOLS.-On all machinery and 
tools used in a mining· or manufacturing business, sixty cents 
on each one hundred dollars of assessed valuation thereof for 
general purposes; and in assessing the value of such ma-
ehinery and tools, the commissioner of the revenue of the 
city of Richmond be, ancl he is hereby, authorized and di-
rected to reriuire each person, firm or corporation making a 
return on machinery and tools, to make return under oath, 
of the origfoal cost price and the book value of such ma-
chiner:y and tools as of the first day of January of each year 
in which the assessment is made, to be used as a basis of 
assessment, which shall be at the fair market value of such 
machinery and tools: provided, that in any case in which 
the commissioner of the revenue has reason to believe that 
any return .made on machinery and tools by any person, firm 
or corporation is inadenuate, the said commissioner of the 
revenue shall be authorized to examine, or cause to be ex-
amined, anv and all books and records -of the person, firm 
or corporation making· such return, and may also reauire the 
attendance. at his office of the person qr persons making- such 
return, and examine such person or persons under oath con-
cerning- the same. 
'' Anv person, firm or corporation violating· any 
page 53 ~ of tl1e provisions of this sub-section, or failin~ to 
complv with the requirements thereof, shall be 
Jiablc to a. fine of not less than ten dollars ($10.00) nor more 
than one -hundred dollars ($100.00) for each offense, recov-
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erable before the police justices of the city of Richmond, as 
the case may be, each day's violation of the provisions of 
this sub-section, or failure to comply with the requirements 
thereof, to constitute a separate offense.'' 
Exhibit No. 3. 
W.D.M. 
Judge 
page 54 ~ A.N EXTRACT FROM CHAPTER 10 OF THE 
RICHMOND CITY COD.ID ·OF 1924. 
''1. There shall be levied and collected for each fiscal year 
the taxes following, to-wit: 
''2. * * • 
"3. 
"4. There shall also be levied on all such real estate and 
tangible personal property a special school tax for school 
purposes of seventy-five cents on each one hundred dollars 
of the taxable value thereof. The special school tax hereby 
levied shall be collected and accounted for by the same offi-
cers and shall be payable at the same times and in the same 
manner as other city tax~s are paid, collected and accounted 
for, except that the said tax when collected shall be segre-
gated as soon as practicable and deposited in a special and 
separate, account to the credit of the city school fund, and 
shall be paid out only upon vouchers drawn by the city comp-
troller to the credit of the city school board to be expended 
in the manner provided by law. 
" •• * 
'' 11. From and after May 1, 1921, there are herebv · im-
posed annually the liconse taxes named in this chapter" upon 
all persons, firms or corporations,. who shall engage for com-
pensation in the city of Richmond in any business, profes-
sional or other produetive occupation listed in this chapter, 
and also the licenses specified on goats, wagons, automobiles 
and other ve.hicles. 
" ..... 
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;page 5'5 r '' 50. Bottlers , of soft drinks, including mineral 
and aerated waters. Not prorated .... $200.00 
'' 63.· Cold storage. ( Shall be taxed as storage warehouses.) 






In the Law & Equity Court of the City of Richmonq.. 
Richmond Orange Crush Bottling Corporation, 
'l). 
City of Richmond. 
PETITION FOR REFUND OF TAXES. 
To the Honorable Robert N. Pollard, Judge: 
The humble petition of the Richmond Orange Crush Bot-
tling Corporation, a corporation organized and existing un-
der the laws of the State of Virginia, duly qualified and au-
thorized to do business as a manufacturer in the State of Vir-
ginia, would respectfully show unto your Honor: 
That it is aggrieved by the erroneous assessment and col-
lection of a tax of the City of Richmond, amounting to the 
sum of Two Hundred Dollars ($200.), the same having been 
assessed as of the first day of January, 1933, against your 
petitioner and paid to the said City of Richmond, as herein-
after more particularly stated. . 
And thereupon petitioner says that the said City of Rich-
mond proceeded to levy and collect license taxes as against 
· your petitioner for the year 1933 by virtue of Chapter 10, 
Section 4, working in conjunction with Section 62 of the City 
of Richmond Code 1924, as amended, which says in effect that 
persons, firms or corporations engaged in the business of 
manufacturing, mixing or bottling soft drinks or carbonated 
50 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. 
beve1~ages shall pay to the said City of Richmond 
page 57 ~ each year a license tax of Two Hundred Dollars 
($200.). 
Your petitioner furth,3r says it is engag·ed in the business 
of manufacturing soft drinks and carbonated beverages and 
sells the products manufactured by it to licensed dealers or 
retailers in the City of Richmond and in other cities, to,-vus 
and counties in the State of Virginia, and that it is taxable 
on capital by the State of Virginia. 
Your petitioner further says that the aforesaid assess-
ment and collection of the said license tax, to-wit, Two Hun-
dred Dollars ($200.), hy the City of Richmond was er-
roneous and illegal under the fifteenth paragraph of Sec-
tion 188 of the Tax Code of Virginia which says so in so 
far as it is material in this cause that • 
'' A manufacturer taxable on capital by the State may, ex-
cept as in this section provided, sell and deliver at the same 
time to licensed dealers or retailers, but not to consumers, 
anywhere in the State, without the payment of any license 
tax of any kind for such privilege to the State, or to any city, 
town, or county.'' 
Your petitioner furt]1er says that the assessment and col-
lection of the aforesaid license taxes by the ,City of Richmond 
was and. is in violation of the provisions of Seeton ·61 of the 
Charter of the City of Richmond, as amended. 
Your petitioner further says that this Honorable Court 
has jurisdiction ·of this cause, under t.he provisions of Section 
414 of the Tax Code of Virginia relating to relief from taxes 
erroneously and illeg·al ly assessed and collected. 
Your petitioner further alleges that it was com-
page 58 ~ pelled, ag·ainst its will, to pay to the City of Rich-
mond the said license taxes by reason of the pro-
visions of Sections 161, 162, and 163 of Chapter 10 of the 
City of Richmond Code 1924, as amended, and relating to pen-
alties and punisbmentH for violations of Chapter 10 of the 
said code. 
IN CONSIDERAT10N THER.E1FOR.E, your petitioner. 
applying for relief under the provisions of the laws of the 
State of Virginia, prays that the said City of Richmond be 
made a party defendant to this petition and that .a copy 
thereof be served upon it, that so much of the said license 
tax as was improperly assessed and collected, to-wit, Two 
Hundred Dollars ($200.) be ordered to he refunded to your 
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petitioner by the said City of R.ichmond. or its Treasurer; 
and for general relief. . 
And your petitioner will ever pray, etc. 
RICHMOND OR.AJNGE CRUSH BOTTLING 
CORPORATIO~, 
By J. D.OUGLAS GORDON, President. 
C. V. WERNE, P. Q. 
A Copy, Teste: 
LUTHER LIBBY, Clerk. 
page 59 ~ "A'' 
Hon. Willis D. Miller, Judge. 
Luther Libby, Clerk. 
Virginia: 
In the Law and Equity Cqurt of the City of Richmond, the 
14th day of December, 1934. 
Richmond Orange Crush Bottling· Corporation, plaintiff, 
against 
City of Ric.hmond, defendant. 
PETITION. 
This matter came on this day to be heard upon the petition 
of the Rfohmond Orang·e Crush Bottling -Corporation here-
to£ ore :filed in the clerk's office; and was argued by counsel. 
It appearing to the Court from the testimony of the wit-
nesses, which included John E. Goode, the successor in office 
of the Commissioner of Revenue making the assessment com-
plained of, that the City of Richmond acting under section 
4 of chapter 10, working- iu conjunction with section 63 of 
the Richmond City Code 1924, as amended, erroneously as-
sessed and collected the sum of two hundred dollars 
($200.00) license taxes for the year 1933, at the rate of two 
'iliundred dollars ($200.00) a year, from the said Richmond 
Orang·e Crush Bottling Corporation; and it further appear-
ing to the Court that such assessment and collection is in vio-
lation of and in contravention to Section 188 of the Tax Code 
of Virginia and is also in violation of section 61 of the Char-
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ter of the City of Richmond, the Court doth order 
page 60 ~ that the ·Comptroller of the said City of Rich-
mond be, and he is hereby, ordered to draw his 
check payable to the Richmond Orange Crush Bottling Cor-
poration, or to C. V. WerJ1e, its attorney, for the sum of 
two hundred dollars ($200.00), as a refund to the said Rich-
mond Orange Crush Bottling Corporation of the tax so er-
roneously and illeg·ally assessed and collected. And the Court 
doth certify that the Ci1y Attorney for the City of Richmond 
appeared and defended the petition aforesaid. 
A Copy, Teste : 
LUTHER LIBBY, Clerk. 
Exhibit "A~' 
W. D. l\L 
Judge. 
page 61 ~ . All of whfoh is signed, sealed and made a part 
of the record in this case, this 6th day of October, 
1942, and after due notice in writing to counsel for the plain-
tiff. . 
WILLIS D. MILLER, Judge. (Seal) 
Virginia: 
In the Law & Equity Court of the City of Richmond. 
City of Richmond, Plaintiff, 
v. 
Home Brewing Company, Inc., Defendant. 
CERTIFICATE OF EXCEPTION NO. 2. 
I further certify that after the issues joined were consid-
ered by the Court, and after all the evidence for the plaintiff 
and the defendant, respectively, which is set forth in Cer-
tificate No. 1 had been presented to the Court, and after the 
case had been argued by counsel for the plaintiff and for 
the. defendant, the Court entered the following judgment, 
which was in these words: 
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page 62 ~ And at another day, to-wit: At a Law and 
Equity Court of the City of Richmond, held the 
18th day of August, 1942. 
This day came again the plaintiff and defendant, by coun-
sel, and the Court having maturely considered the evidence 
. in this case and now being advised of its judgment to be 
rendered herein; it is ordered that the plaintiff recover 
against the defendant the sum of eleven hundred seventy-one 
dollars and fifty-three cents with interest on eleven hundred 
and thirteen dollars, a part thereof, to be computed after the 
rate of six per cent per annum from the 1st day of June, 
1940, until paid and its costs by it about its suit in this be-
half expended; to which action of the Court the defendant, 
by counsel, excepted. 
Memorandum: Upon the trial of this case the defendant, 
by counsel, excepted to sundry rulings and opinions of the 
Court given against it, and the defendant having signified its 
intention of applying· to the Supreme Court of Appeals of 
Virginia for a writ of error and sttpersedeas, it is ordered 
that the judgment this day entered in this proceeding be sus-
pended for a period of ninety days from this date and until a 
petition for a writ of error and suversedeas is acted upon, 
if said petition be filed within the period prescribed by law 
in order to enable the said defendant to apply for such writ 
of error and supersedeas, upon condition that said defendant 
or someone for it enter into bond before the Clerk of this 
Court in the penalty of two thousand dollars, with 
page '63 ~ surety to be approved by said Clerk and condi-
tioned according· to law within fifteen days from 
this date. 
Upon the motion of the defendant, by counsel, leave is 
hereby given it to present bills or certificates of exception 
herein to the Judge of this Court at any time within sixty 
days from this date as prescribed by law. 
page 64 ~ I further certify that the defendant excepted to 
the entry of said Final Order as being contrary 
to the law and evic}ence, which order was entered on the 18th 
day of August, 1942. 
Given under my hand this 6th day of October. 
WILLIS D. MILLER, Judge. 
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page 65 ~ I, Luther Libby, Clerk of the Law and Equity 
Court· of· the City of Richmond, do he11eby certify 
that the foregoing is a complete transcript of the record in 
the above entitled case wherein City of Richmond is plain-
tiff and Home Bre.wing Company, Incorporated, is defendant, 
and that the plaintiff had due notice of the intention of the 
defendant to apply for such transcript. 
I further certify- that the defeµdant has executed bond in 
the penalty of two thousand dollars with all conditions of a 
supersedeas bond. · 
Witness my hand this 19th day of October, 1942. 
LUTHER LIBBY. 
Fee for Record $20.()0/100. 
A Copy-Teste: 
M. B. WATTS, C. C. , 
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